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by Joseph F. Johnson
Math Dept., Villanova Univ.
Abstract
Analysing Quantum Measurement requires analysing the physics of amplification since amplification
of phenomena from one scale to another scale is essential to measurement. There still remains the task of
working this into an axiomatic logical structure, what should be the foundational status of the concepts
of measurement and probability. We argue that the concept of physical probability is a multi-scale phe-
nomenon and as such, can be explicitly defined in terms of more fundamental physical concepts. Thus
Quantum Mechanics can be given a logically unexceptionable axiomatisation. We introduce a new defi-
nition of macroscopic observable which implements Bohr’s insight that the observables of a measurement
apparatus are classical in nature. In particular, we obtain the usual non-abelian observables as limits of
abelian, classical, observables. This is the essential step in Hilbert’s Sixth Problem.
Introduction
Hilbert’s Sixth Problem is the axiomatisation of Physics. In 1900 at the International
Congress of Mathematicians in Paris, Hilbert proposed 23 problems the solutions of which,
he predicted, would require major advances in mathematical technique and lead to major
advances in mathematical knowledge. Some few of these problems have been fulfilled
neither of these expectations, but most of them have amply repaid expectations. The first
six problems were about foundations, of logic, set theory, geometry, and Physics.
The Sixth Problem has not been considered one of his best. It has generally been
considered sort of borderline. This paper will argue that that is because it has been
misunderstood and Hilbert’s original focus, in its historical context, has been lost sight
of. The revolutionary developments in Physics that followed 1900 have only reinforced
the prescience of Hilbert’s own formulation of the difficulty in the foundations of Physics.
In fact the essence of the solution has been published, in various pieces, in the physics
literature already, and only needs to be clarified and assembled.
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From the standpoint of axiomatics, Physics has been in a crisis, or at least a mess,
from 1927* on: the problem is called that of Quantum Measurement.
So much so, that ever since then, it has often been questioned whether the axiomatic
method is even appropriate for Physics. (That, of course, is why Hilbert suggested that
mathematicians should do the work on this problem.) One of Hilbert’s other foundational
problems in mathematics has indeed turned out contrary to his conjecture: Goedel’s famous
undecidability theorem showed that Hilbert was too optimistic in the statement of his
conjecture. Now if in fact it is the case that the axiomatic method of Euclid, Archimedes,
Newton, Hertz, Klein, and Hilbert is inappropriate to Physics, that would be a claim
whose definitive establishment could only be accomplished by an axiomatic analysis of the
foundations of Physics similar to Goedel’s. This must be regarded as an open question, but
it will be answered by this paper that no such fear is really justified: Quantum Mechanics
does not introduce anything new in this regard in comparison to Classical Mechanics,
there is nothing in Quantum Mechanics to stand in the way of an axiomatic foundation to
Physics such as Newton and Hertz essayed. Even more precisely, there is no need to change
normal 18th century logic or philosophy. It is possible to axiomatise Quantum Mechanics,
at least, in the same way Newton and Hertz operated with Classical Mechanics.
We will neglect gravity, and assume that Schroedinger’s equation is universally and
precisely true, and is exactly linear and unitary. One might wonder whether future de-
* As J.S. Bell put it in his last published article[3], ‘Surely, after 62 years, we should have an exact
formulation of some serious part of quantum mechanics? By “exact” I do not of course mean “exactly
true.” I mean only that the theory should be fully formulated in mathematical terms, with nothing left to
the discretion of the theoretical physicist . . . until workable approximations are needed in applications. By
“serious” I mean that some substantial fragment of physics should be covered. Nonrelativistic “particle”
quantum mechanics, perhaps with the inclusion of the electromagnetic field and a cut-off interaction, is
serious enough. For it covers ‘a large part of physics and the whole of chemistry.’ I mean, too, by “serious”
that “apparatus” should not be separated off from the rest of the world into black boxes, as if it were not
made of atoms and ruled by quantum mechanics.’
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velopments in Physics will render these considerations irrelevant. Many physicists have,
privately, felt that the present axiomatic mess of Quantum Mechanics would just be ren-
dered irrelevant, obsolete, by future developments in Physics. The methods of this paper
will retain some interest in any case: they are robust, and so would probably carry over to
future modifications, even non-linear ones. Some physicists such as Weinberg, feel that the
logical structure of Quantum Mechanics is so rigid, so incapable of slight modifications,*
that it will persist in any future theory, even at the Planck scale or involving strings or
branes. Be that as it may, this paper will cover ‘a serious part of Physics.’
The solution to be offered will be essentially statistical mechanical in nature. J.S.
Bell3 has influentially criticised many earlier proferred solutions of a statistical mechanical
nature, we will carefully meet the important points he has raised. Our claim is that
the underlying physics of many earlier solutions, such as that of H. S. Green9, Daneri–
Loinger–Prosperi 10, Colemann–Hepp11, is basically sound, and Bell’s criticisms can be met
by being axiomatically and logically careful about the development of these same physical
concepts. The underlying physics is that of amplification due to the coupling between a
microscopic system with a larger assembly in a state of negative temperature. In order to
meet Bell’s criticisms, we will define the concepts of probability and measurement in terms
of fundamental undefined notions such as energy, space, and time. Such explicit definitions
are the only ingredients really missing from published solutions. Bell’s criticisms were
substantially logical, foundational, and axiomatic in nature, so it should not be surprising
that meeting them requires axiomatic care, even to indulging the axiomatic temperament.
Other attempts (such as Lucien Hardy’s) to axiomatise Quantum Mechanics or Quan-
* Dreams of a Final Theory, New York, 1992, pp. 87-89, 211.
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tum Information Theory are quite antagonistic to Hilbert’s point of view.
History
In 1900 when Hilbert proposed this problem, the landscape of Physics was very differ-
ent from now. For a hundred years or more, physical science had been riven by completely
incompatible theores: mechanics was incompatible with electricity, thermodynamics with
both, and atomism (the contribution of chemists) and the theory of chemical structure
seemed like an alien kind of magic. Vitalism and phlogiston theories were tolerated. Each
rival theory was put on its own axiomatic basis, and the difficulty was that of reconciling
the competing theories and domains. But steady progress was made towards overcoming
these contradictions, due not to advances in mathematical technique so much as physical
insights. Lorentz and Poincare were just formulating the precise way in which the symme-
tries of Maxwell’s equations were incompatible with the symmetries of Newton’s equations,
and although this still left electrodynamics in a state of crisis, it was progress. Maxwell
and Boltzmann had also made serious progress on explaining heat and thermodyanmics in
terms of statistical properties of the Newtonian mechanics of large assemblages of billiard
balls of the same size as atoms. Although this still left Statistical Mechanics in a state of
crisis because of the problems with irreversibility and ergodicity, it encouraged Hilbert to
pose the problem.
Perhaps the reason Hilbert was still optimistic was because within mathematics itself,
similar difficulties of competing domains had been triumphantly overcome. In 1600, only
geometry was axiomatic, and number theory and algebra were so amorphous that Fermat
suffered from a writer’s block about number theory which did not affect him when he
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wrote his geometric book. By 1700, the new analysis had evolved with its own new unde-
fined concepts, and without any axiomatic order or organisation, and so the three different
fields of Geometry, Algebra, and Analysis had the same sort of incompatibility and do-
main problems that afflicted Physics later. But the heroic labours of Cauchy, Weierstrass,
Grassmann, and Cantor put an end to this gradually. It was called the arithmetisation
of Analysis: the vague concepts of analysis were given precise definitions in terms of the
concepts of arithmetic, algebra, and so on. Klein contributed by unifying non-Euclidean
geometry with Euclidean geometry, thus removing the mysticism and philosophical opposi-
tion to non-Euclidean geometry. Hilbert and others continued by a formal axiomatisation
of Euclidean geometry (as opposed to Euclid’s own, which was informal and seemed to
require diagrams). Peano, Cantor, and Frege gave clear and unambiguous definitions of
‘function’, ‘variable’, ‘number.’ Russell showed how all of Analysis needed for mathemati-
cal physics could be deduced from a dozen logical axioms and a few logical concepts.
Probability theory still stood aloof from this unification and had no axiomatic basis.
(Wittgenstein made a stab at it at the end of the Tractatus.)
By 1925 the landscape of Physics had completely changed. But let us not get ahead
of ourselves too much. Let us try to see Hilbert’s point of view in its context. Although
aware of Poincare’s work, he did not focus on the crisis in electrodynamics. He focussed
on the logical foundations of Boltzmann’s work.
“6. Mathematical treatment of the axioms of physics
“The investigations on the foundations of geometry suggest the problem: To treat in the same
manner, by means of axioms, those physical sciences in which mathematics plays an important part; in
the first rank are the theory of probabilities and mechanics.
This is amazingly prescient for 1900. Special and General Relativity (to which Hilbert
contributed Einstein’s equation, a few days in advance of Einstein), soon succeeded in
5
accomplishing the unification of Classical Mechanics with Electromagnetism, without pro-
ducing any axiomatic messes. But the controversy over the foundations of Statistical
Mechanics is especially an axiomatic problem. The task Maxwell and, later, Boltzmann,
set themselves was to deduce thermodynamics from Hamiltonian Mechanics. But in or-
der to do this they introduced new methods which were powerful, but lacked proof, and
when used without sufficient mathematical care, led to the following obvious contradic-
tion: ‘entropy always increases’ is in obvious contradiction to the time-reversal symmetry of
Newton’s laws of motions and to Poincare recurrence. Worse, they introduced new physical
concepts without adequate definition: the concepts of probability and mixed state. (Now
if one reformulates this, as has been done, in terms of information, this merely transfers
the problem to a synonym: one has introduced the new concept of information without
adequate physical definition.)
Sometimes an axiomatic analysis of foundations shows that one needs more primitive
concepts and more explicit axioms about them than was realised. For example, in the
axiomatic analysis of the concepts of geometry, where one found out that Euclid needed
more concepts than he had specified: in order to eliminate Euclid’s reliance on diagrams
and intuition, Pasch, Hilbert, and others, had to introduce explicit foundational (hence
undefined and primitive) concepts such as ‘between’. Sometimes one finds out that con-
cepts which everyone assumed had to be primitive are in fact reducible to other concepts.
For example, in analysis, where Cauchy and Weierstrass showed that fewer concepts were
really needed, since undefined concepts like ‘limit’ could after all be given definitions in
terms of basic arithmetic concepts. And Frege, after all, number did not need to be as-
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sumed, it could be defined, too. So, Russell: it was no longer true that geometry was about
a proprietary concept of point that could not be defined, or ‘order’, with arithemtic about
its own patented undefined notion of number, rather all these concepts previously thought
to be foundational and undefined, could be defined in terms of ‘true’, ‘proposition’, etc.
So, phlogiston got eliminated by having temperature, heat, defined in terms of motion.
But, alas, probability and mixed state got introduced as new undefined concepts. So an
axiomatic analysis would investigate whether probability was needed, as a new primitive,
or whether it could be defined in terms of the other undefined, primitive concepts. Can
the notion of mixed state be eliminated? These questions are typical of the axiomatic
temperament.
Hertz successfully displayed the axiomatic temperament when he reduced all laws of
Newtonian mechanics to one, his own variational principle, and all primitive, undefined
concepts to three. After 1900, Minkowski, Hilbert, and Klein dabbled in Relativity to do
the same.
Now let us fast forward to Schroedinger’s development of Wave Mechanics (the rela-
tivistic equation he did not publish till years later, now usually called the Klein–Gordon–
Schroedinger–Fock equation) in 1925. All of Physics (except cosmology and gravity) is now
explained by one equation. Immediately, mathematicians and physicists under Hilbert’s
influence began the task of axiomatising the new mechanics. Weyl, participating in a sem-
inar with Debye and Schroedinger, was the first to publish an axiomatisation. Hilbert, von
Neumann, and Nordheim attempted one which is now forgotten. Wigner and von Neumann
continued these efforts and published one now regarded as definitive of its type. Dirac was
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by no means under Hilbert’s influence, but under the influence of Sir James Jeans, Charles
Galton Darwin, and Ralph Fowler. He published his own, which is not expressed in the
Klein–Hilbert style, but is often regarded as equivalent to the von Neumann–Wigner one.
But the resulting system is not a system of axioms in Hilbert’s sense (or in Euclid,
Newton, Hertz, Klein, Russell, Bell, etc.) Not because of its use of new concepts such as
probability or measurement or observer or uncertainty. Wigner analysed exactly what the
new system’s problem, from this perspective is, and gave it the name Quantum Duality.
This will be explained in detail in the next section of the paper, by way of anticipation,
we will just say that the same physical situation can be analysed in two different ways by
choosing to use some axioms and ignore others, or vice versa, and with different results.
The whole point of formalising a theory into axiomatic form is to eliminate the need for
discretion, experience, good taste.*
Can some basic concepts be eliminated by being defined in terms of the others? Is
there more than one way to do this? What are the exact logical relationships between the
different concepts and axioms? Can some be deduced from others? Can the dual overlap
Wigner identified be eliminated? The problem Hilbert first called attention to in 1900
becomes still more central in 1927 than anyone else would have thought.
Now let us rewind to Boltzmann, and his irreversibility, versus Zermelo and Poincare.
Which Hilbert was concerned with. In the 20’s, this problem was solved by Darwin and
Fowler. They put the existing statistical mechanics on a completely satisfactory, logically,
* ‘There is nothing in the mathematics to tell what is “system” and what is “apparatus”, nothing to
tell which natural processes have the special status of “measurements”. Discretion and good taste, born of
experience, allow us to use quantum theory with marvelous success, despite the ambiguity of the concepts
named above in quotation marks. But it seems clear that in a serious fundamental formulation such
concepts must be excluded.’ Bell, Beables for Quantum Field Theory. 1984 Aug 2, CERN-TH. 4035/84
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foundation and even succeeded in solving some new problems with their methods. Indeed,
even by 1905, Jeans had outlined the common-sense but logically insightful resolution of
this particular problem.* Again by way of anticipation, we will just outline the solution,
which eliminates the need for the concept of probability. Statistical Mechanics is the study
of the statistical properties of the ‘normal’ state (or trajectory), and Jeans gave a reasonable
definition of what he meant by ‘normal’. Boltzmann’s deduction of irreversibility takes
place within a statistical model, which makes certain approximations compared to the
exact Hamiltonian model. That deductions from an approximation will be of limited
validity does not deserve to be considered a crisis or paradox!
Next, let us pass to Hilbert’s concern with the use of probabilities in Boltzmann’s
deductions. Hilbert wisely pointed to two different aspects of probability. The first is
the notion of physical probability, as used by Boltzmann in his very formulations. Par-
allel to this would be to clarify the mathematical definition of probability as used in the
mathematical techniques used by Boltzmann and Maxwell in their deductions. So Hilbert
called for ultimately defining, if possible, and axiomatising a new undefined primitive, if
necessary, of physical probability in such a way that it could be used as Boltzmann used it.
And as a useful preliminary to this, clarifying within mathematics merely, the axiomatic
status or definition of the mathematical concept of probability.
Borel and Levy resisted this to the end of their days, just as did Poincare resist
* Some writers have interpreted this to mean that H will continually decrease, until it reaches a
minimum value, and will then retain that value for ever after. A motion of this kind would, however,
be dynamically irreversible, and therefore inconsistent with the dynamical equations of motion from which
it professes to have been deduced. As will appear later, the truth is that we have at this point reached
the limit within which the assumption of molecular chaos lead to accurate results. The motion is, in
point of fact, strictly reversible, and the apparent irreversibility is merely an illusion introduced by the
imperfections of the statistical method. Jeans, The Dynamical Theory of Gases, second edition, London,
1916, p. 38.
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Hilbert’s logical aims. Wiener, however, in 1922, following Frechet, used measure-theoretic
notions of Borel and Lebesgue to rigourously formulate the notions of probabilites used
heuristically by Einstein in the theory of Brownian Movement. Then Kolmogoroff sys-
tematised this and published the influential axiomatisation of probability now well known.
From a Hilbertian point of view, what Kolmogoroff did was exactly what he asked for as
a preliminary to the ultimate goal. But it should not be called, from a Hilbertian point of
view, an axiomatisation of probability: it is quite the other possibility that Kolmogoroff
succeeded in establishing: an explicit definition of mathematical probability in terms of
prior, already defined, foundational concepts: those of measure. Hence the explicit def-
inition of (mathematical) probability is accomplished, and Kolmogoroff showed that the
entire branch of mathematics known as probability theory was incorporated in the grandly
unified structure, going back to those dozen axioms of logic . . . and no new undefined,
primitive concept or axiom was required. Within the scope and aims of the Hilbert prob-
lem, Kolmogoroff showed that the law of large numbers, say, was no different from the
theorem 1+1=2 in Principia Mathematica. This eliminated the mysticism and philosophy
from the mathematical theory of probability, and was an essential step in avoiding seeming
paradoxes involving continuous probabilities in geometric settings. The theory of stochas-
tic processes could not have developed in the continuous time setting without this. (But
Kolmogoroff well knew that it did not solve the ultimate goal of the axiomatic analysis
of the notion of physical probability and did not solve the problem of giving a logically
unexceptionable definition of the concept of physical probability. This difficulty will be
exposited in detail in a later part of this paper.)
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Even after this accomplishment, it could be wondered whether the physical concept
of probability was amenable to something similar, or would require new, Bohrian com-
plementarity style axioms or new quantum logic axioms or goodness knows what else, or
even the abandonment of the axiomatic method in Physics. The point of this paper is
to show that the concept of probability in Physics can be defined and the measurement
axioms involving it be derived from more fundamental axioms and concepts, not involving
the notions of measurement or probability or information or observation.
We should not postulate a measure. We must derive the measure from physical prop-
erties of the system. We should not introduce subjective notions (such as information) in
order to derive the measure. We may use the notions introduced by Poincare into ‘general
dynamics’ (such as stability or density or ‘almost everywhere’). These notions are mere
logical combinations of physical notions and do not introduce anything new.
Perhaps it is appropriate to remark here that philosophical commitments should not
be allowed to trump physics and logic. If more than one solution is possible which satisfies
the requirements of agreement with experimental results and the requirements of logic,
then one could let philosophical predilections, like a bias in favour of positivism, help
one choose between possible solutions. But not otherwise. Twentieth century physicists
are more unanimous in philosophical commitments than they used to be, and this is not
necessarily a good thing. There are a variety of respectable philosophical positions even
vis-a-vis science, which have existed or are possible, and if there is a solution which sat-
isfies the requirements of experiment, logic, and is consistent with any such respectable
philosophy, then rival philosophical commitments should not be allowed much weight. Cur-
11
rently, monism is widely accepted by scientists, but dualism used to be more current, for
example, with Newton, Leibnitz, and Hertz* allowed that one had to still keep an open
mind between dualism and monism. If the choice has to be made between monism plus
verificationism plusabandonment of the axiomatic method, on the one hand, and dualism,
on the other, then that would be an important fact to be established. The reader is asked
to proceed without assuming that logical positivism and verificationism are proved. We
adopt either Wittgenstein’s definition of ‘meaning’, viz., the meaning of a statement is the
state of affairs which would be the case if the statement were true, or any other normal
meaning that would be accepted by Newton, Maxwell, Hertz, or the classical epistemology
of Classical Physics. The reader is asked to put aside any prejudices against counter-factual
conditionals. The experience of physics pedagogy in that we sometimes study two systems
as if they were isolated, and then as if they were coupled, suggests that counter-factual
conditionals are meaningful. Perhaps the reason outlandish philosophies (such as quantum
logic, verificationism, restrictive positivist-style rules as to what is meaningful and what is
not, complementarity) have been resorted to has been the assumption that this axiomatic
mess cannot be cleaned up. Let us see.
Physicists of the twentieth century already cleaned up the physical mess of physi-
cal theory existing in Hilbert’s day, and without introducing any new messes. With this
axiomatic mess cleaned up along Hilbertian lines, it is possible that Hilbert’s Sixth Prob-
* In the text we take the natural precaution of expressly limiting the range of our mechanics to inan-
imate nature; how far its laws extend beyond this we leave as quite an open question. As a matter of
fact we cannot assert that the internal processes of life follow the same laws as the motions of inanimate
bodies; nor can we assert that they follow different laws. According to appearance and general opinion
there seems to be a fundamental difference. And the same feeling which impels us to exclude from the
mechanics of the inanimate world as foreign every indication of an intention, of a sensation, of pleasure
and pain,—this same feeling makes us unwilling to deprive our image of the animate world of these richer
and more varied conceptions. Hertz, Die Prinzipien der Mechanik, Leipzig, 1894 p. 45.
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lem is essentially solved, provided that future developments in Physics do not introduce
essentially new axiomatic messes. But it transpires that it is necessary to abandon monism.
The Analysis of the Axiomatic Difficulty
Wigner1 wrote several fundamental analyses of the problem of quantum measurement,
and the formulation of the problem which we adopt here is due to him, he called it the
problem of quantum duality. He was aware of the style of thinking in Hilbert’s orbit.
The deterministic axioms of Quantum Mechanics, in Weyl’s formulation, assume, to begin
with, that every system is a closed system. To every system is associated a Hilbert space
H, and a Hamiltonian operator H. Every physical state of the system is described by a
ray in that Hilbert space, as usual, we fudge the identifications and consider a non-zero
wave function ψ instead of the ray. If the state of the system at time t = 0 is ψ0, then its
state at time t is given by
ψt = e
−2piitH
h · ψ0 ∈ H.
But there are separate, probabilistic axioms for measurement processes. For every
observable, there is a self-adjoint operator Q on H. If the system in the state ψ undergoes
a measurement process associated to this observable, the only possible results are the
eigenvalues {λi} of Q. Assuming that ψ is normalised and that its Fourier decomposition
with respect to the normalised eigenvectors of Q is ψ =
∑
i civi, then the probability that
the result will be λi is |ci|
2. Dirac added the following axiom. If the result is λi, then the
system is, as a result of the measurement process, in the state given by the wave function
vi even though such a transition or jump (called the reduction of the wave packet) disobeys
Schro¨dinger’s equation. (We reserve discussion of this for a projected sequel.)
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On the other hand, the measurement apparatus itself must be a quantum system,
possessed of a Hilbert space Hn to describe its physical states (n is the number of particles
in the apparatus) and a Hamiltonian Hn to govern its time-evolution if it were in isolation.
Then the state space of the combined system of the microscopic, as we will call it, system
originally under discussion and which is being measured, and the macroscopic, as we will
call it, measuring apparatus, is Hcomn = H⊗Hn and the joint Hamiltonian is the sum of the
two Hamiltonians which would have governed each system in isolation plus an interaction
term (this is almost tautological)
Hcomn = H ⊗ In + I ⊗Hn +H
int
n .
The problem of quantum duality, Wigner1, was that we have two rather different
mathematical descriptions of the same physical process and it is not at all clear how to
compare them. In the former description, we are implicitly treating the measurement
apparatus as if it were a classical system which did not obey the superposition principle
so that we are sure that the result of the measurement process is always a definite pointer
position, as it is called, a macroscopic pointer visibly and definitely pointing to one or
another of the various possibilities λi. Bohr (as quoted in J. Jauch, E. Wigner and M.
Yanase2) always insisted that the measurement apparatus had to be classically describable
and classical in nature. Heisenberg (cf. J. Bell3) always insisted that we have to put a cut
somewhere, marking off when we use the first three axioms to analyse things, and when
we use the measurement axioms. Von Neumann (as reported in Wigner1) showed that
as long as we do put the cut somewhere eventually, it makes no difference where we put
it. Wigner contributed to this analysis, emphasising that on the classical side of the cut
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will always be the observer’s consciousness, at least. So the methodology of introducing
a cut used to be considered the solution to the problem of quantum duality. But this no
longer commands a consensus in light of advances in mesoscopic engineering, detection of
quantum mesoscopic chaos, macroscopic superpositions of states, and so on.
Einstein asked the vague but profound question whether or not the probabilities of
the latter three axioms did not arise from some underlying deterministic dynamics in an
analogous way to the way they did in classical statistical mechanics. He seems to have
thought that this would mean either revising Schro¨dinger’s equation or perhaps intro-
ducing hidden variables. But the logically sophisticated treatment of classical statistical
mechanics due to C. Darwin and R. Fowler4, and extended by A. Khintchine5, does not
introduce hidden variables. For us, the method by which G. Ford, M. Kac and P. Mazur6
carry out the Gibbs program for the case of harmonic oscillators with a cyclic nearest
neighbour interaction is paradigmatic. (J. Lewis and H. Maassen7 has extended this.) By
focussing Einstein’s question on Wigner’s formulation of the problem, we can answer it
positively, taking Schro¨dinger’s equation as the underlying deterministic dynamics. That
is, we derive the probabilistic axioms from the deterministic axioms. We make no other
assumptions8 (Farhi, Goldstone and Gutmann made several tacit ad hoc assumptions), ex-
cept that we have to introduce some sort of dictionary that compares quantum states with
macroscopic pointer positions, or else the comparison of the dual descriptions is logically
impossible. Basically, we push the cut out to infinity. No real quantum system is exactly
a measurement apparatus, but the thermodynamic limit of quantum amplifying apparati
becomes a classically describable measurement apparatus which exactly verifies the three
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probabilistic axioms in the limit as n→∞.
Physically, this model has much in common with aspects of previous work of H.
Green9 and A. Daneri, A. Loinger, and G. Prosperi10. One important physical difference
with Coleman—Hepp11 is that the notion of macroscopic which we will introduce is the
opposite of their notion of local observable (which is from the theory of infinite volume
thermodynamic limits, but not physically appropriate here). The idea that coupling a
Brownian mote to a negative temperature amplifier will amplify the motion of the mote
from quantum motion, where observables do not commute, to classical motion, where the
non-commutation becomes negligible, is perhaps due to J. Schwinger12. Our model is that
of a non-demolition measurement, however, and we assume that the amplifier exerts zero
force on the incident particle.
This has mathematical similarities to the literature on the problem which takes the
open system approach. But the physics is different. We make the transition to irreversible
classical stochastic dynamics a function of the coupling between the apparatus and the mi-
croscopic system. W. Zurek12 and others14 such as M. Collett, G. Milburn, and D. Walls15
use a sort of open systems approach in that they put the interaction which is supposed to
turn quantum amplitudes into classical probabilities in the coupling with the environment
instead of in the coupling with the amplifier. We assume instead a closed joint system.
In principle, this difference should be detectable by experiment. We also predict that the
degree of validity of the probabilistic axioms should worsen as the size of the amplifying
apparatus approaches the mesoscopic or even microscopic. This should be detectable by
experiment as well. The only real novelty is the notion of macroscopic which we introduce.
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The need for a precise definition of macroscopic has long been felt. Indeed, it is not possi-
ble to compare the two dual descriptions of the measurement process unless some sort of
dictionary is provided. Von Neumann and Wigner16 (footnote 203) seems to have missed
the need for a relatively sophisticated dictionary, and simply assumed that a macroscopic
pointer position corresponded, more or less approximately in the strong topology on Hn,
with a large set of wave functions. It seems to be this unquestioned assumption which has
been the obstacle to progress along Wigner’s original lines. Abandoning it may mean the
abandonment of the ancient dream of psycho-physical parallelism. ([16], p. 223.)
In connection with this I quote P. Dirac17. “And, I think it might turn out that
ultimately Einstein will prove to be right, . . . that it is quite likely that at some future
time we may get an improved quantum mechanics in which there will be a return to
determinism and which will, therefore, justify the Einstein point of view. But such a
return to deteminism could only be made at the expense of giving up some other basic
idea which we now asume without question. We would have to pay for it in some way
which we cannot yet [1977] guess at, if we are to re-introduce determinism.” In this regard
I wish to point out that there is almost no credible evidence in favour of the hoary psycho-
physical parallelism, and there is a good deal of evidence for the time-dependent form of
Schro¨dinger’s equation’s being absolutely linear and unitary.
It will be noticed that our physical interpretation, then, is that there are only waves.
There are no particles. The problem of quantum duality, then, becomes the problem of
calculating, relatively explicitly, how it is that the interaction of the wave of, say, a mi-
croscopic system with one degree of freedom (called, sentimentally, an incident particle)
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interacts with the wave of the amplifiying apparatus to sometimes (with a definite prob-
ability) produce a “particle-event,” i.e., the registering of a loud click on the part of tha
apparatus, and other times, produce no such detection event. Thus the seeming particle-
events, the seeming detection of particles, is an artifact of the amplification process in the
interaction of two waves.
Feynman, famously,18 did not think so, but he did think that perhaps a little more
could be said about the problem of wave-particle duality (p. 22):
“We and our measuring instruments are part of nature and so are, in princi-
ple, described by an amplitude function satisfying a deterministic equation. Why
can we only predict the probability that a given experiment will lead to a definite
result? From what does the uncertainty arise? Almost without a doubt it arises
from the need to amplify the effects of single atomic events to such a level that
they may be readily observed by large systems.
“ . . . In what way is only the probability of a future event accessible to us,
whereas the certainty of a past event can often apparently be asserted? . . . Ob-
viously, we are again involved in the consequences of the large size of ouselves
and of our measuring equipment. The usual separation of observer and observed
which is now needed in analyzing measurements in quantum mechanics should
not really be necessary, or at least should be even more thoroughly analyzed.
What seems to be needed is the statistical mechanics of amplifying apparatus.
It is usually not necessary to think about the philosophical meaning of probability, as
A. Sudbery19 remarks, “It is not in fact possible to give a full definition of probability in
elementary physical terms.” “Attempts to define probability more explicitly than this are
usually either circular . . . or mysterious . . . This is not to say that the question of what
probability means, or ought to mean, is not interesting and important; but the answer
to that question, if there is one, will not affect the properties of probability that are set
out here, and we can proceed without examining the concept any further.” All that is
necessary is to straightforwardly imitate the classical methods of statistical mechanics, in
a physically appropriate way. Remarkably, the result we arrive at corresponds exactly to
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J. von Plato’s philosophically motivated amendment20 of the traditional frequency theory
of probability. The naive frequency theory suffered from grave logical circularities and
Professor von Plato fixed these by incorporating a physical, ergodic dynamics. mechanics.
His work has not received the attention it deserves because he had to rely on the underlying
dynamics’ being deterministic, so it was usually assumed that his purely logical, almost
antiquarian concerns, could not be relevant to a quantum world. This turns out to be a
misapprehension. It is, however, useful to revise Professor von Plato’s theory in two ways.
Firstly, time averages are not, for us, the definition of probability, they are the definition
of measurement. Secondly, we need to extend it to dynamical systems which although not
ergodic, are, because of their large number of degrees of freedom, approximately ergodic
in some respects, as envisioned by Khintchine.
Analysis of the Role of Probability
Each axiom by itself would be a viable candidate. It is only when all five (let alone all
six) are taken together as a system that we get a mess. They do not form an axiom system
in the usual sense of the word. This aspect was analysed in the previous section. The
aspect to which we now turn is the role and status of the concept of (physical) probability.
From now on the word probability by itself always refers to physical probability, and
never to mathematical probability. The operationalisation of the concept of probability is
going to be retained unchanged as unproblematic: the great practical successes of Physics
demand this: we always operationalise the process of measuring a probability as counting
the number of successes in trials (repeated trials of an experiment) and dividing by the
number of trials. The fact that we always get different answers is not unusual for practical
physics, this was true in astronomy as well even in ancient times. But since we do not
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adopt positivism, this operationalisation does not have to be accepted as the meaning of
the concept of probability.
If we are to formalise the language of Physics, to construct a formal axiomatic system
with any such axioms and concepts in it, we must pick which concepts are primitive (unde-
fined), state which axioms they satisfy, and define all other concepts in terms of the given
ones. Derive all future physical propositions as theorems, following from the definitions
and axioms with no new assumptions. Hilbert would have asked us to investigate whether
probability is primitive or not, and, if primitive, what are its axioms, and if not, what is
its definition in terms of system, state, and Hamiltonian? Likewise for measurement.
The logical problem of circular definition: an existing consensus
The usual ‘definition’ of probability is well-known to be logically imprecise, even cir-
cular.
‘If the experiment is repeated a large number of times it will be found that each
particular result will be obtained a definite fraction of the total number of times, so that
one can say there is a definite probability of its being obtained any time the experiment is
performed.’*
Now, it is not carping or nitpicking to point out that this is, if taken au pied de la
lettre, untrue. And, if not so taken, it does not count as a definition, from the Hilbertian
standpoint. Dirac has not succeeded in defining the concept of physical probability. It is
not strictly true because if one large number is a prime, and another large number is a
different prime, it is impossible for the same definite fraction of successes to be obtained.
Features which do not, to my mind, count as defects in an operationalisation, can be
* P. Dirac, The Principles of Quantum Mechanics, Oxford 1930, p. 10.
20
fatal flaws in a logical definition. And that is what we have here.
Many famous mathematicians have shared substantially the same understanding of
the logical flaw, circularity, in any attempt to define the concept of physical probability
that remains close to the idea of frequency. For example, Burnside,* in a polemic with
Fisher, and also Littlewood and Kolmogoroff whom we will quote.
Firstly, Littlewood† explains, in his insular way, the same point we have made in
distinguishing between the task of defining the mathematical concept of probability and
the physical concept, and also between the tasks of asserting mathematical propositions
about mathematical probability, and scientific propositions (or axioms) about physical
probability.
‘Mathematics . . . has no grip on the real world; if probability is to deal with the real world
it must contain elements outside mathematics, the meaning of ‘probability’ must relate to the
real world; and there must be one or more ‘primitive’ propositions about the real world, from
which we can then proceed deductively (i.e. mathematically). We will suppose (as we may
by lumping several primitive propositions together) that there is just one primitive proposition,
the ‘probability axiom’, and we will call it ‘A’ for short.
‘ . . . the ‘real’ probability problem; what are the axiomA and the meaning of ‘probability’
to be, and how can we justify A? It will be instructive to consider the attempt called the
‘frequency theory’. It is natural to believe that if (with the natural reservations) an act like
throwing a die is repeated n times the proportion of 6’s will, with certainty, tend to a limit, p
say, as n→∞. (Attempts are made to sublimate the limit into some Pickwickian sense—‘limit’
in inverted commas. But either you meanthe ordinary limit, or else you have the problem of
explaing how ‘limit’ behaves, and you are no further. You do not make an illegitimate conception
legitimate by putting it into inverted commas.) If we take this proposition as ‘A’ we can at least
settle off-hand the other problem, of the meaning of probability, we can define its measure for
the event in question to be the number p. But for the rest this A takes us nowhere. . . . Now
an A cannot assert a certainty about a particular number n of throws, such as ‘the proportion
of 6’s will certainly be withing p ± ǫ for large enough n (the largeness depending on ǫ)’. It
can only say ’the proportion will lie between p± ǫ with at least such and such probability
(depending on ǫ and no) whenever n > no’. The vicious circle is apparent. We have not
merely failed to justify a workable A; we have failed even to state one which would work if its
truth were granted.
* W. Burnside, “On the Idea of Frequency,” Proc. Camb. Phil. Soc., 22 (1925), 726.
† Littlewood, A Mathematician’s Miscellany, London, 1956, p. 32.
21
Essentially the same criticism was made by Kolmogoroff in his contributed chapter
to Alexandroff, Kolmogoroff, and Lavrentieff, ed.s, Mathematics its content, Methods, and
Meaning, 2nd ed., Moscow, 1956, we cite from a Cold War translation published in 1963 in
Cambridge, Mass., p. 239, “ . . . it is clear that this procedure will never allow us to be free
of the necessity, at the last stage, of referring to probabilities in the primitive imprecise
sense of this term.”
Three approaches in the literature
Many naive attempts to fix this problem have been published, but none have suc-
ceeded. (Professor von Plato’s is far from naive and is postponed until later.) We will only
deal with von Mises, Hardy, and Farhi–Goldstone–Guttmann.
Richard von Mises carefully analysed the circularity involved in trying to say anything
like, the larger the number of trials, the greater will be the likelihood that the ratio of
successes to trials will be, for all observers, within a small epsilon of each other, etc. This
word ‘likelihood’ is either a synonym, in which case this attempt is circular, or needs a
definition, and none has been provided. Furthermore, von Mises opined that no rigourous
foundation could be provided for Statistical Mechanics and so one must abandon anything
like the frequency theory and take another road. His suggestions for a positive solution
need not detain us, even though related ones were proposed by Alonzo Church, later, and
in the 60’s, Kolmogoroff, since they are remote from Statistical Mechanics, unphysical, and
have not been able to justify the use in Physics of probability the way Hilbert demanded.
His opinion that a rigourous justification was impossible has been disproved, by recent
successes in the theory of Hamiltonian Heat Baths, stemming from the breakthrough work
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of Ford–Kac–Mazur6 in 1965.
Next we will consider one of the Quantum Information style axiomatisations, this one
due to Lucien Hardy.
‘Axiom 1 Probabilities. Relative frequencies (measured by taking the proportion
of times a particular outcome is observed) tend to the same value (which we
call the probability) for any case where a given measurement is performed on
an ensemble of n systems prepared by some given preparation in the limit as n
becomes infinite.*
Here, probability is defined (but ‘result’ and ‘measurement’ are primitive). The words
‘any case’ are subtly vague, as we shall see.
Could Hardy’s suggestion as to ‘the limit of this ratio as the number of experiments
increases to infinity’ be adopted? Let us concede the meaningfulness of an actual or
potential infinity of repeated experiments. The missed opportunity here is, what is the
definition of ‘limit’? In mathematics, there is no one canonical definition of limit. There
are different ones which apply to different situations. There is the limit of a sequence, of
values of a function, the limit in mean of a sequence of functions, weak limits, etc. (In this
paper, we will define a new kind of thermodynamic limit, and argue that it is just what
is needed to fix this problem.) None of these apply unless we can argue that the physical
situation of repeated experiments is modelled by the particular mathematical concept
chosen. (We will, eventually, argue that the axioms allow us to model measurement, but
not other repetitious situations, by the Hamiltonian of an amplifier with an extremely
large number of degrees of freedom, but a given, fixed, invariable initial condition, which
we will analyse the way Jeans suggested).
It is clear from context that Hardy intends the elementary notion of the limit of a
* L. Hardy, Quantum Theory from Five Reasonable Axioms arxiv.org/quant-ph/0101012.
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sequence. So he has defined probability incidentally and by the way, and the major empir-
ical content of his axiom is that the limits always exist. This is surprisingly problematic
(no surprise to the experts).
Firstly, mathematical sequences are deterministic: timeless, they have no dynamics.
The one-millionth result is already determined in advance. It would be intuitively and
emotionally odd if this was the right concept to use for Hardy’s purposes. But let that
pass. Secondly, and more importantly, not all sequences possess the property he demands,
that the fraction does indeed have a limit. This is why there is significant empirical content
to his axiom: only those sequences are physically possible which do indeed have a limit.
This simply does not work. If one experimental situation has one sequence, fn, whose
limit is one-half, and a different one has a different sequence, gn, say, with some limit, too,
(for simplicity, we may assume it is one-half), clearly we may physically construct an elec-
tronic AND-gate or what-not and make logical, Boolean combinations of the results, and
the resulting sequence will be equally physical. But it is easy to construct such sequences
whose logical combinations do not possess any limit at all. So we see that the words ‘any
case’ are not really well-defined. It seems pointless to try to introduce a countable hierarchy
of patches to this theory by postulating that every reasonably physically implementable
combination of sequences must also possess limiting frequencies . . . (Perhaps this is the
same problem von Mises ran into with his theory of selections from collectivities?) There
was never anything physical about Hardy’s postulate to begin with.
The above point is an immanent but physical critique of the logical consequences of
his empirical assumption. In my opinion it is decisive. An easier (but not decisive) point
can be made: the usual laws of probability do not in fact guarantee that such limits exist,
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and the propensity theory does not make this assumption. The laws of probability clearly
state that the probability that in two rival infinite runs of the same experimental setup,
two different limiting ratios will occur, or one limiting ratio will occur in one but no limit
in the other, or, no limit in either, is zero, but probability zero does not mean impossible,
such a ‘violation’ of our expectations is physically and logically possible. So Hardy is (and
he is allowed to do this, but it seems odd and unwise) explicitly postulating that physics
does not obey the laws of mathematical probability, that physical probability, as he has
defined it, does not satisfy the axioms of mathematical probability (and this carries over,
later, to the laws of non-Kolmogoroffian probability in his other more developed contexts).
(His postulate wreaks havoc with the mathematical notion of stochastic independence.)
In brief, the usual interpretation of the laws of mathematical probability as applied
to the fair toin coss situation is that it is physically and logically possible for every single
toss to come up heads, and that such a ‘violation’ does not contradict the statement that
the probability of a result of heads is one-half. Hardy wishes to make the frequency theory
more important than the mathematical laws. To accomplish this axiomatically, he would
need to reconstruct the mathematical theory of probability so that it would match his
physical postulate.
Can the much-cited paper of Farhi–Goldstone–Gutmann be taken at face value? Its
argument rests, crucially, on a careless fallacy of equivocation. They use the same notation
for two very different meanings, and at a crucial point in their argument, switch, imper-
missibly, betweeen the two meanings. I do not doubt for a minute that there could be
some physical motivation for supposing that there is a statistical correlation, in all normal
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applications, between the two different meanings, but they neither make such an assertion
explicitly, nor would such an unproved asserion be useful in an axiomatic analysis. Indeed,
their explicit claim to have reduced their result to the principle of invariance of physical
results under change of co-ordinates suggests that they made the switch inadvertently.
Their key claim is that a formulation of quantum mechanics without explicit reference
to probabilities allows them to instead appeal to the general philosophical principle that
physical results must be independent of the choice of coordinates used to calculate them,
the appeal occurring at a point where a certain map, which they construct, would, they
claim, have to be an isometry for this principle to hold good. By construction, that it is
an isometry means a probability measure is defined uniquely. This might be fair if they
had in fact defined the map and the measure in the very places they claim to have defined
them, but they have not.
More precisely, they alert us to their desire ”to contruct a transformation from the
basis . . . of normalised states to the basis . . . of infinite norm states.” (This is evidently
in order to later appeal to the general philosophical principle as stated much previously in
their paper, ‘the necessity to describe physics in a basis independent manner.’) This would
be (not a ‘transformation’, but a) change of basis matrix if it were not for the fact that
the two ‘bases’ are of different cardinalities, one countable, and the other un-countable.
What they must mean, from context, is that they desire to exhibit two formulae, (TII) will
express the co-ordinates of an element Ψ with respect to the countable basis in terms of
any given co-ordinates with respect to the uncountable basis, and (TIII) will be the other
way round. That is, the map is the identity map on a quite concrete Hilbert space, V
(∞)
c
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the element Ψ does not change.
An ‘infinite norm state’, as usual, is not an element of the Hilbert space V
(∞)
c itself,
but is a linear functional defined on a dense subspace. The formulas are, then, only valid
on a dense subspace. This, probably, is why they equivocate between whether, for a fixed
infinite sequence {jn}, their ‘infinite norm state’ 〈b; {jn}| is a linear functional, or whether
it is a mere formal symbol which, when applied to a vector |Ψ〉 ∈ V
(∞)
c , yields 〈b; {jn}|Ψ〉,
an L2-equivalence class of functions on the measure space Y of all infinite sequences {jn}.
In the former case, we are dealing with alternate co-ordinate descriptions of the same
vector. (But only on a dense subspace). In the latter case, we are dealing with a concrete
map between two different spaces which can be extended to be an isometry. That these
two different set-ups can be described by formulas which look alike is irrelevant to general
philosophical principles! This is not simply a change of basis.
As we have just elucidated, they switch from interpreting this ‘basis independence’ as
alternate descriptions of the same vector, to interpreting it as a map between two different
vector spaces which must be extendable to an isometry on their respective completions.
This is fallacious. Our analysis of every naive version of the frequency theory shows that the
sticking point is what to do about this negligible, but physically possible, set of ‘violators’,
of measure zero. What they have done is defined a physically meaningful operator F on
only a dense subspace of the Hilbert space, then, mapped this by an isometry to a space
where they can extend it by a neat formula. But on this other space, it no longer has the
same logical and physical significance, when extended. The operator F , when extended,
no longer is a ‘frequency’ operator.
In fact, the paper is just a tangle of conceptual confusions (from the point of view of
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axiomatic investigation, or from the standpoint of Hilbert’s Sixth Problem).
On page 370 they correctly assert just what we mentioned in our discussion of Lucien
Hardy, that the strong law of large numbers says that the set of all sequences whose
proportion of heads does not settle down to any limit or settles down to the wrong limit,
has measure zero. Then they immediately pass to a non-equivalent statement: |ψ〉∞ is an
eigenstate of the operator F (θi). They immediately assert that this last statement is a
‘quantum version’ of their previous statement. This is just confused. Their axiom PIV’
clearly states that if a quantum system is described by the state |θi〉 then a measurement
of the observable ‘will yield the value θi’. They just admitted that there is a non-empty
set of sequences for which this is not true. This is Pickwickian, in the Littlewoodian sense,
applied to ‘will yield’. Whatever can they mean, formally and axiomatically, by ‘will yield’
if in fact they admit* that it might not yield?
In general, the difference between the strong law of large numbers and the weak law
of large numbers is irrelevant for addressing this problem. If the probability is continuous,
probability zero does not mean impossible, so no advance has been made over saying
the event of a violation of the long-run average’s settling down to a definite fraction is
‘unlikely’. (Kolmogoroff was certainly an expert in the difference between the strong law
and the weak law that Farhi et al. make such a big deal of, and his considered opinion
on the matter has been recorded.) One could introduce a new primitive physical term,
‘negligible’, and add a new postulate, probability zero means the event, although possible,
* ‘For a recent expression of the view that on the contrary there is no real problem, only a ‘pseudo-
problem’, see J. M. Jauch, Helv. Phys. Acta 37, 293 (1964). . . . current interest in such questions is
small. The typical physicist feels that they have long been answered, and that he will fully understand just
how if ever he can spare twenty minutes to think about it.’ J. Bell and M. Nauenberg, “The Moral Aspect
of Quantum Mechanics,” in De Shalit, Feshbach, and de Hove, eds., Preludes in Theoretical Physics, in
Honour of Weisskopf, Amsterdam, 1966, 279-86
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is negligible. Let anyone who wishes to rely on this, be conscientious about writing down
all the details. Then the mathematical notion of passing from one function to another one
in its L2-equivalence class could validly be the model of the physical notion of neglecting
negligible differences.
Lastly, they still assume observable and measurement as primitives, without any at-
tempt to elucidate the relationship between physical measurement and other physical pro-
cesses. This means they have proved uniqueness but not existence.
It would be unlikely if the solution to the problem of quantum measurement did not
rely on the physics of measurement, but only on axiomatic analysis.
A new approach
The structure of the axioms themselves suggest that there are two scales going on, and
that probability is a multi-scale phenomenon. Feynman, as quoted, went into this phys-
ically. That will be our approach. Then, to be consistent, one must make measurement
a two-scale phenomenon. Further, since observables only crop up in the ‘large’ axioms,
this strongly hints that they are part and parcel of the concepts to be derived, rather than
assumed. Our approach will be to use the usual Hamilton-Liouville abelian dynamical
variables, and we will not refer to them as observables. We will derive the new properties
of (quantum, non-commutative) observables from the definition of measurement and prob-
ability. This will become clearer when the model is concretely spelled out. This marks the
major logical change between this paper and all previous papers, even recent ones such as
Allahverdyan–Balian– Nieuwenhuizen, which assume the usual properties of observables
even while they are deducing them from the Hamiltonian and Schroedinger’s equation.
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Mere logical combinations of concepts are always admissible since they do not rely
on new physical concepts. Since the mathematical theory of probability shows that it is
equivalent to give the probability measure, or to give the mathematical expectation of
every integrable function (since this allows the measure to be re-constructed from these
expectations), we need only give a physical definition of the expectations. Then the same
logical processes that derive mathematical probabilities from the expectations, can be used
to derive the numbers representing the physical probabilities from the numbers representing
the physical expectations. And that is how we will proceed.
Einstein’s insight, that quantum mechanical probabilities might be a statistical me-
chanical phenomenon, suggests we look carefully at what Hilbert asked for in the derivation,
within Classical Mechanics, of probabilities and irreversible phenomena, from determin-
istic equations of reversible evolution. To do this we must not postulate ignorance or
probability distributions, and must, still, define probability. Now Professor von Plato has
done this if the dynamics is ergodic. Also, Darwin–Fowler set up Statistical Mechanics
without the use of probability, they used a neutral term ‘weight’ to make it clear that they
were merely making a mathematical definition. In the retrospect afforded by the work of
Ford–Kac–Mazur, and looking forward to use in quantum measurement, it is possible to
assemble the different contributions of Darwin–Fowler and Professor von Plato along lines
Khintchine conjectured, at least in some special cases, to give an answer Hilbert would
have accepted as logically ‘clean.’ We will do this in the next section, and fortunately it
applies to at least a toy model of a quantum amplifier, which will follow.
Although logically and axiomatically ‘clean’, it is convoluted, just as was Russell’s
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theory of description. But its empirical content is still very close to the logically muddled
frequency theory, and this is a serious recommendation. That it is logically convoluted is
by no means a piece of evidence against it, since, as Russell remarked in the Introduction
to the Principia,
‘The grammatical structure of language is adapted to a wide variety of usages.
. . . Language can represent complex ideas more simply [than simple abstract
ones]. The proposition “a whale is big” represents language at its best, giving
terse expression to a complicated fact, while the true analysis of “one is a number”
leads, in language, to an intolerable prolixity.’
Russell, according to Wittgenstein, first showed us that the logical structure of a
proposition need not be its apparent grammatical structure. And he had the theory of
description in mind. The simple word ‘the’ required an elaborate ‘unpacking’ to get at its
logical function as part of a description. It should not be surprising that if, on physical
grounds, the concept of probability should be a two-scale process, then too, its logical
structure should be very far from the apparent grammatical structure of the frequency
theory or its use in Physics. I hope the reader will excuse any consequent intolerable
prolixity.
The Logical Structure of Statistical Mechanics
Our procedure is modelled on that of Ford–Kac–Mazur, which indeed is modelled on
the usual understanding of the Gibbs program. (Later we will point out two significant
alterations, inspired by work and far-seeing remarks of Wiener and Khintchine.)
In Sir James Jeans, the very sane idea is expressed that Statistical Mechanics is the
study of the statistical properties of the normal state* (or trajectory, same thing). The
* ‘The first object of statistical mechanics is to determine all the “normal” properties of such an
assembly and correlate them with the properties of matter in bulk as we know it, when the assembly
is in complete equilibrium. . . . We may define the “normal” properties of the equilibrium theory in the
manner of Jeans, or perhaps more naturally as all those properties which the assembly possesses on a time
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statistical properties are such as mean, dispersion, correlation, auto-correlation, three-point
correlations, and so on. None of these ideas depend on the concept of probability, they are
‘statistical’ in the precise sense of being summary statistics meant to convey some idea of
the properties of a large (even infinite) amount of data. The data are conceived of as quite
deterministic. The definition of normal* is not given with full logical rigour, but this will
be fixed later. Jeans’s definition of normal† is, a state is normal if the set of other states,
all of whose statistical properties are the same as this given state, is infinitely probable. By
this he means that as the number of degrees of freedom of the system increase, the ratio
of the Liouville measure of this set of states, divided by the measure of all other states
which the system could pass into, goes to infinity. We see at once that no real idea of
physical probability is being relied on here, just Liouville measure (or, rather, the measure
inherited on the surface of constant energy from Liouville measure, or, if more controllable
integrals of the motion are present, the smaller dimensional surface of ‘accessible states’).
Now every such statistical property involves some kind of time average.
lim
T→∞
1
T
∫ T
0
f(xt)dt.
The Gibbs procedure was to first argue that these time averages would be equal to phase
averages ∫
ME
f(x)dµ(x)
with respect to the microcanonical distribution, and also with respect to the canonical
average.’ Fowler, Statistical Mechanics, Cambridge, 1929, p. 8.
* Ehrenfest and Ehrenfest, §18b, The Conceptual Foundations of the Statistical Approach in Mechan-
ics, p. 41
† Jeans, op. cit., Ch. III, §§52,58, and Ch. V, §§87.
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(Gibbs) distribution.
∫
f(p, q)αe−βEdpdq where β is inverse temperature.
The argument was not rigourous. It has been made rigourous in enough special cases that
we can have confidence that von Mises was wrong, it will be possible to give the procedures
of Statistical Mechanics an axiomatically sound derivation as Hilbert asked for.
Consider a sequence of Hamiltonian (linear, conservative) dynamical systemsMn with
degrees of freedom n →∞. Each system should in some physically intuitive sense be the
‘same, except for the increase in degrees of freedom’. The 1965 breakthrough of Ford–Kac–
Mazure was to derive Brownian motion (more precisely, the Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process)
from a sequence of assemblies of harmonic oscillators with symmetric and cyclic couplings,
increasing in strength, and a kind of renormalisation.
The procedure was to consider a dynamical variable fn on each finite system, Mn
(having Hamiltonian, say,
Hn =
∑ p2i
2
+
1
2
Qn(qo, . . . qn) for Qn a quadratic form .
It was the momentum po of the Brownian mote. They then took a kind of phase average
of this, its autocorrelation function, gn(τ) =
∫
fn(p, q)fn(pτ , qτ )αe
−βEdpdq. (It has since
been shown that their results are insensitive to the choice of the mixed state of the heat
bath.) They then passed to the limit, g∞, as n approaches ∞ using a cut-off procedure.
I want to emphasize the following logical aspects of the procedure. EachMn is first re-
placed by a Gaussian, deterministic, stationary, stochastic process (arising from the Gibbs
distribution artifially imposed on it). None of these processes are ergodic or Markoffian, so
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they cannot be Brownian motion. Next, each process is completely characterised by one
datum, its phase auto-correlation function.* So, each Mn is replaced by this one function
gn. The individual states are totally gone. Now this sequence of functions has a limit,
uniform on compact sets. (Each gn is continuous and bounded and quasi-periodic). The
limit function is exponential decay. We have, thus, first passed to a ‘dual object’ (the gn),
then taken a limit. Now we un-dualise. There is a unique (up to stochastic equivalence)
stochastic process which is Gaussian, stationary, and has that limit function g∞ as its
phase auto-correlation function. It is not deterministic, and that is how probabilities arise
from determinism if Statistical Mechanics is done logically carefully. (Furthermore, K.
Hannabuss’s use23 of the Sz. Nagy dilation is in much the same tradition: the dilation is
constructed simply from the correlation functions.)
Notice the following important point. Because we are interested in phenomena in the
limit as n approaches ∞, yet one cannot directly compare a value of fn on a vector vn
with fn+1(vn), we have to study statistical properties instead of individual points such as
fn(vn). This is the logical reason for adopting such a procedure.
Because we have adopted such a procedure, we do not need to construct a limit
dynamical system whose individual trajectories are composed of limits of the individual
trajectories of the finite systems. But we adopted such a procedure because in fact it is
logically impossible to do such a construction. This is not a direct sort of limit. The states
of the limit dynamical system are not constructed from limits of trajectories or states of
* A standard theorem in stochastic processes says that a Gaussian, stationary stochastic process is
determined up to stochastic equivalence by its phase auto-correlation function, and is Markoffian if and
only if that function is exponential decay. Further, all higher auto-correlations are easily calculable in
terms of the two point ones referred to.
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the finite systems. It is a double-duality sort of construction.
Because Ford–Kac–Mazur present this as a ‘result’ of imposing the Gibbs distribution
early, it seems to most undergraduates that the probabilities arise from the imposition
of this distribution, and much pedagogical ingenuity has been expended on motivating
this particular distribution. But the results are robust and do not much depend on the
particular distribution (except that it should not be negative temperature!!!) so this is a
red herring.
This does not fit into the Jeans–Darwin–Fowler scheme, but it is routine to adapt
these results so that it does. (Although it does not seem to be in the literature anywhere.)
As n increases, the measure (on a surface of constant energy) of states which are within
ǫ of obeying the law of equipartition of energy and have nearly equally distributed plus
and minus signs (‘random’, intuitively speaking) becomes overwhelming, becomes infinitely
probable, in Jeans’s terminology (as is well known). Hence such states are the normal state
because direct calculation shows their time autocorrelations are all approximately equal
and tend, in the limit, to the same exponential decay typical of Markoffian processes. And
are all approximately equal to the phase autocorrelations calculated by Ford–Kac–Mazur
explicitly. (As always, the phase calculations were much easier than the time averages,
and, furthermore, Ford–Kac–Mazur did not have to worry about normal state because the
average wiped out the contribution of the ‘violators’, as we have been calling them.)
This suggests that their postulation of a heat bath probability distribution is without
real foundational significance, it is simply a crutch to circumvent a difficult calculation and
a difficult argument. But in this linear model, the difficulties are not great.
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The limit stochastic dynamical system Ford–Kac–Mazur obtained, the Ornstein–
Uhlenbeck process X(α, t) (for α ∈ [0, 1] with Lebesgue measure) has a normal cell: almost
all α are such that the sample path X(α, t) as t varies, has time auto-correlation equal
to the phase autocorrelation with respect to all α (which is exponential decay) (since it
is ergodic) and so it is a limit dynamical system for the Mn with respect to time auto-
correlations, too. As a ‘dynamical system’ it is a little odd. The ‘initial conditions’ are
the α, which are not points on the ‘trajectories’ (the sample paths). We have, in fact,
left the category of dynamical systems we were working in: the ‘limit object’, if we insist
on having one, is not a stochastic dynamical system in any usual sense, it is merely an
abstract stochastic process constructed out of the correlation function. We needn’t really
have undualised at all! (And, actually, Ford–Kac–Mazur did not trouble themselves to
undualise, they simply exhibited the correlation function.) As far as the philosophy of
probability is concerned, there seems to be an important lesson in this: probability only
arises if we actually depart from the category we were working in, to study an idealised
approximation which really belongs to a quite different category.26,28
This approach makes it much clearer that probabilities arise only in the limit object,
and only because it is a double duality. They did not arise through coarse-graining,
subjectivity, ignorance, loss of information, or any extraneous new concept. They are
a merely linguistic feature of an unphysical limit which is a good approximation to certain
limited, statistical, bulk aspects of M1023.
Therefore probability can be defined explicitly in terms of this sequence and the se-
quence of observables.
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Khintchine, in the period from 1943 until his death in 1953, pointed out how true
ergodicity ought not to be needed, and how the Darwin–Fowler logical outline (which we,
here, attribute to Jeans as well) ought to be workable for a wide class of physical problems,
classical as well as quantum. But he was unable to rigourously justify every step, such as
approximate ergodicity. The breakthrough model of Ford–Kac–Mazur is what Khintchine
was lacking.
But meanwhile, Professor von Plato, of Helsinki University, well versed in issues of
logic, foundations, and axiomatics, was from another direction solving the problem of
a logically unexceptionable, physically based definition of probability. It assumes the
dynamics is ergodic and thus does not make use of the two-scale aspect of Statistical
Mechanics, but it can be generalised to apply to approximately ergodic sequences as above.
More importantly, it can be generalised to quantum mechanics, where the dynamics
is not even approximately ergodic. The point is that if it is given that a system is in a
certain subset of states, ‘normal’ is a relative term with no probabilistic significance, we
could instead simply study the statistical properties of that subset of states. If we knew
that the system M1023 were in a definite state vo, and if we could somehow justify that
its statistical properties could still be approximately calculated by passing to the limit,
where stochasticity arises, the essential logical structure of Statistical Mechanics does not
change, only its technical calculation techniques may need adjustment. Therefore, the
thermodynamic limit of deterministic systems, all of them in a known pure state, could
still be a stochastic process. This is exactly what will happen in the case of a quantum
amplifier. So for our purposes, the full generality of approximate ergodicity and how to
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alter Professor von Plato’s theory is not needed. If a phase space consists of one or two
points, ergodicity is not hard to investigate. In the negative temperature situation, our
limit system will consist of two points. The interesting question of adapting Professor von
Plato’s theory to the logical structure of classical Statistical Mechanics, as outlined by
Wiener and Khintchine, has been the topic for a separate paper.28
Nevertheless, we will recapitulate Professor von Plato’s major breakthrough in just
enough detail so that our adaptation of it in the penultimate section of this paper, to
quantum amplifiers, will be seen in context as a modest step further instead of a strange
and unmotivated hack.
Professor von Plato’s Ergodic Theory of Probability
The Boltzmann-Gibbs development of statistical mechanics, especially as reformulated
by Einstein in his doctoral thesis and subsequent work, does not quite follow the Jeans–
Darwin–Fowler–Wiener–Khintchine logical structure as we have sketched it. Primarily
because it assumes ergodicity, and secondarily because it imposes a probability distribution
on the phase space by fiat instead of defining probability explicitly. Nevertheless, in a well-
known paper20 Professor von Plato showed, in the Boltzmann–Gibbs–Einstein framework,
how to give a logically unexceptionable, non-circular, and physically based definition of
probability if the underlying dynamics is deterministic and ergodic. In this section we
recapitulate his logical structure.
Fix n and suppose that the dynamical system Mn is ergodic. Suppose that fn is
a fixed dynamical variable on Mn. By Birkhoff’s strong ergodic theorem, for almost all
initial conditions xo ∈Mn, the time average of fn,
〈fn(xo)〉t = lim
T→∞
1
2T
∫ T
−T
fn(xt)dt
38
exists. By the way, the theorem shows it almost always exists even if the dynamics is not
ergodic, as long as the measure dµ(x) is preserved by the flow x 7→ xt.
Furthermore, it almost always equals the phase average of fn,
〈fn〉 =
∫
Mn
fn(x)dµ(x).
Because mathematical probabilities of any event can be reconstructed if all the math-
ematical expectations of dynamical variables are known (provided, of course, that they
satisfy the necessary additivity properties), we will have defined physical probability if we
have defined physical correlates to all these expectations. That is, we are reduced to the
problem of giving a logically unexceptionable definitiion of the physical expectation of fn,
since fn was arbitrary. Every measurable subset S of the dynamical system is physical, so
we need to give a physical meaning to the expectation of fn on S. It suffices to assume fn
is the characteristic function of S and give a logical definition to the expectation of fn on
all of Mn. Professor von Plato has provided this in a way that mimics Einstein’s use of
the concept of probability (expectation) in his work, and in a way that is intuitively close
to the idea of frequency.
We define the expectation of fn to be the time average 〈fn〉t. If the dynamics were
discrete and fairly repetitive, as if it were a softball pitching machine, this would be the
intuitive idea of limiting frequency. But it is a statistical notion which does not involve
the idea of probability.
More precisely, we define the expectation of fn to be the value of this time average
for normal trajectories, and we know that this exists and is unique by ergodicity.
The break-through improvement over naive frequency theories is that we have a physi-
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cal basis: this definition is not logically circular because it assumes there is a deterministic,
ergodic dynamics. There is still a negligible set of ‘violators’ in a physical sense: if we define
‘measurement’ to mean the physical system is in a definite trajectory with initial condi-
tion xo and measurement of the value of fn means 〈fn(xo)〉t, then it would follow that if
this point were in the measure zero set such that the limit either were ‘wrong’ or did not
exist, then the actual measurement would not be equal to its expected value, or would be
indeterminate. Then the result of the ‘experiment’ would not verify the ‘theory.’ This is
a good feature of Professor von Plato’s theory. The difficulty of negligible but real ‘viola-
tors’ ought to be present in any physical theory of probability, his achievment is to make
it logically and axiomatically harmless: it is now a feature of praxis, with a theoretical
correlative as part and parcel of a well-posed logical structure.
I have argued elsewhere25,26,28 that three modifications are desirable in Professor von
Plato’s theory. Firstly, probability (or, equivalently, expectations) should be defined as
phase averages and time averages should model measurements. What for him is a def-
inition ought to be re-interpreted as a theorem that probabilities predict the results of
measurements but cannot otherwise be directly observed. Secondly, following the Wiener–
Khintchine programmatic, we should embedMn and fn in a thermodynamic limit sequence,
and only assume the usual thermodynamic hypotheses which yield approximate ergodicity
for some fn. Thirdly, the underlying deterministic dynamics should be that of Quan-
tum Mechanics in the particular physical setting of a quantum amplifier. Probabilities
should not be expected to arise except when microscopic aspects are being amplified to
macroscopic dimensions.
Because we are defining probability to be a limit phenomenon, our definition of prob-
40
ability is an ‘unpacking’ style definition like Russell’s theory of description, rather than a
straightforward definition like Professor von Plato’s. A statement such as ‘the probabil-
ity that the result of a measurement of Q will yield the result λ is p’ is unpacked into a
system of statements which are not actually about results or Q, just as the proposition
‘The current King of France is bald’ is not about a (non-existent) King of France. Our
analysis of measurement is that it is an idealised thermodynamic limit. Therefore, our
analysis of this proposition is that it asserts that a negative temperature amplifier can be
coupled to the microscopic system being ‘measured’ in such a way that when this com-
bined system is modelled by a thermodynamic limit approximation, the approximation
yields a measure on a classical space of results and the measure assigns a measure of p to
the labelled result. The physical significance of such statements is that the approximation
is an approximation to a time average of a directly physically meaningful function on the
actual, unapproximated, quantum phase space of the amplifier. This will become clearer
by example. See also the discussion in28. Probability is a linguistic feature of an approx-
imation procedure. (If infinite systems relevantly coupled to things being measured really
exist in Nature, perhaps some of this indirection will be unnecessary.)
The next section gives a toy model, which is basically that of H.S. Green and many
others, and the logical status of the three modifications will be clear by example. Because
of the conjectured robustness of the limiting procedures of Statistical Mechanics, the future
progress of mathematics ought to be able to show that the features of this model hold good
in a certain amount of generality. But we use a two-level model as is usual in the discussion
of lasers and amplifiers in quantum optics.
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The Concrete Model
The picture is of n particles in a line. Each one passes on its state to its rightmost
neighbour, and the first one receives its state from the one on the right end (this is the
cyclicity). This takes place in time 1
n
. (A more realistic, but still simplified and explicitly
solvable, model of an amplifying apparatus is based on the Curie-Weiss phase transition27.
However, they are not concerned with deriving the properties of observables from the first
three axioms, but feel free to use all six axioms indiscriminately. Nor do they care to define
macroscopic precisely, but content themselves with showing that the off-diagonal elements
in the density matrix decay, in the limit. This does not escape Bell’s criticisms* , which
we are especially concerned to meet. The underlying physics behind this model and their
model is the same as that of H. S. Green9, op. cit.)
From now on, we distinguish between measurement apparatus and amplifying appa-
ratus. The amplifying apparatus we study will be an explicitly given quantum system with
n degrees of freedom, Mn, modelled by a Hilbert Space Hn and with a Hamiltonian Hn. It
approximates more and more to a measurement apparatus as n → ∞. The measurement
apparatus is a thermodynamic limit of Mn, denoted M∞, and is a classical dynamical
system. Its states are the equilibrium states of the thermodynamic limit, and are not
described by wave functions, its state space is a symplectic manifold, not a Hilbert space,
has no linear structure, superposition of states is a nonsensical undefined concept for it.
* ‘The result (15) is [called by Hepp[11]] the “rigourous reduction of the wave packet.” If the “local
observables” Q (as distinct in particular from the “classical observables”) are thought of as those which
can in principle actually be observed, then the vanishing of their matrix elements between two states means
that coherent superpositions of ψ+ and ψ− cannot be distinguished from incoherent mixtures thereof.
In quantum measurement theory such elimination of coherence is the philosopher’s stone. For with an
incoherent mixture specialisation to one of its components can be regarded as a purely mental act, the
innocent selection of a particular subensemble, from some total statistical ensemble, for particular further
study.’ Bell, [3]. This is the criticism of statistical mechanical proposed solutions which is an independent,
and prior, issue to any discussion of von Neumann’s so-called projection postulate.
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Classical mixtures of its states are possible, as always in classical Statistical Mechanics.
One can take the viewpoint that measurement apparatuses and processes are unphysical
idealisations of the only processes that are physical, the amplifying processes. This is a
valid logical interpretation of the measurement axioms (even, after some contortions, the
reduction of the wave packet) and it does not involve any change in the operationalisation
of the concept of measurement. In fact, it grounds in concrete calculations what used to
be operationalised anyway without justification: the fact that an amplifying apparatus
must be large before the measurement axioms are verified. A one-atom device does not
perform a measurement . . . or reduce the wave packet. But if infinite systems do exist
in Nature, this concrete calculation should yield accurate results. Because it makes solv-
ing the problem harder, not easier, we will assume that only finite systems are realisable.
But the line of argument we introduce here is extensible and portable. (If new systems,
Hamiltonians, even forces of Nature are discovered that still fit into the logical framework
of Quantum Mechanics, similar procedures to what we introduce here should carry over
and give similar results.)
Let the state space of an incident particle be C2. This space has basis {ψ0, ψ1}.
For each n, Hn is the Hilbert space of wave functions describing the state space of an
n-oscillator system which is an amplifying device. We let Hn =
(n)︷ ︸︸ ︷
C2 ⊗C2 . . .C2.
In the presence of an incident particle in the state ψ1, the amplifying apparatus will
evolve in time under the influence of An (called “Ming,”since it leads to a bright and
clear phenomenon), a cyclic nearest-neighbour interaction which is meant to model the
idea of stimulated emission or a domino effect. In the absence of a detectable particle, the
dynamics on the amplifying device will be trivial. This means that
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Hcomn = (C ·ψ1⊗Hn)
⊕
(C ·ψo⊗Hn) and we put H
com
n = I2⊗An+ I2⊗ I2n . The
intuition is that ψ1 means the particle is in the state which the apparatus is designed to
detect. but ψo means the particle is in a state which the apparatus is designed to ignore.
It will simplify things if we assume n is prime. (The general case can be reduced to
this by perturbation.) Let q = 2
n
−2
n
(which is an integer by Fermat’s little theorem).
Let i be any integer between 0 and 2n − 1. There are n binary digits di with i =
∑n−1
0 2
idi and uniquely so. If {|1〉, |0〉} is a basis for H1, then |i〉n = ⊗
n−1
0 |di〉 form a
basis of Hn. The intuition is that the i
th oscillator is in an excited state |1〉 if di = 1 and
is in the ground state |0〉 if di = 0. We also write |i〉n = |d0d1 . . . dn−1〉.
We wish to find Ming such that in one unit of time the di are cycled as follows:
e
2pi
h
An |i〉n = |dn−1d0d1 . . . dn−2〉.
Choose a set of representatives bi such that every integer k from 1 to 2
n − 1 can be
written uniquely as bi2
m mod (2n − 1)Z for some 1 ≤ i ≤ q and 0 ≤ m ≤ n − 1, that is,
k = bi2
m+ j(2n− 1) for some j but i is unique. (Since 2n− 1 and 2m are relatively prime,
no matter how k and m are fixed, there exist unique bi and j satisfying this.)
Then each |bi〉 represents an orbit under the action of e
−2piAn . Re-order the basis as
follows: let vo = |b1〉, v2 = |b12〉, v2 = |b12
2〉, . . . vn−1 = |b12
n−1〉, vn = |b2〉, vn+1 = |b22〉,
. . . , v2n−1 = |b22
n−1〉, v2n = |b3〉, etc., up to v(q−1)n = |bq〉, v(q−1)n+1 = |bq2〉 . . . ,
v(q−1)n+n−1 = |bq2
n−1〉, but (q − 1)n + n − 1 = 2n − 3, so we have 2n − 2 basis vectors
accounted for. Let v2n−2 = |0〉 and v2n−1 = |2
n − 1〉.
Let V1 be the space spanned by {vo, . . . , vn−1}, let V2 be the space spanned by
{vn, . . . , v2n−1}, etc., up to Vq . Let Vo be the space spanned by {v2n−2, v2n−1}. The
Ming Hamiltonian operator An on Hn is a direct sum of its restrictions to the Vi. Its
restriction to V0 is to be the zero operator. Each Vi is isomorphic to V1 and we give the
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matrix of each restriction of An with respect to the given bases.
Solving An =
h
2π
log


0 0 . . . 0 1
1 0 . . . 0 0
0 1
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
. . . 0
...
0 . . . 0 1 0


,
we obtain a cyclic skew-hermitian matrix, whose i, jth entry, −ih
n2
∑n−1
k=0 ke
2pii
n
k(i−j), is
approximately (if n is large compared to i− j) ih (i−j)
−1
2pi unless i = j in which case
ih
2 .
As usual in classical statistical mechanics, the observables are all abelian, and are given
by measurable functions on the phase space, hence fn is an observable if fn : H
com
n → R is
measurable and f(cψ) = f(ψ) for c ∈ C×. In order to avoid confusion with the orthodox
primitive concept of observable, modelled by a linear operator, we will not refer to fn as an
observable and will not use the term ‘observable’ in our system at all. These measurable
functions are dynamical variables, as usual in Hamiltonian dynamics.
The intuitive picture is that this device is getting more and more classical as n goes to
infinity. So the energy levels get closer and closer, approaching a continuum, the oscillators
get closer and closer which is why the interaction, at a constant speed, travels from a
oscillator to its neighbour in less and less time. If we adjusted by rescaling the dynamics
to accomplish this, the entries of Hn would diverge with n. We rescale h instead, so that
it decreases as 1
n
, This is typical of rescaling procedures in classical statistical mechanics.
It is physically meaningful because the thermodynamic limit is never physically real, it is
only one of the Hn which is physically real: n is not a physical variable, it is a parameter.
Passing to the limit is only a mathematical convenience to obtain simple approximations for
the physical truth about H1.1×1036 . Since h is truly small, this yields valid approximations.
We must couple the amplifier to the incident particle. The Hilbert space of the
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combined system is Hcomn = C
2 ⊗ Hn =< ψ0 > ⊗Hn⊕ < ψ1 > ⊗Hn. So we need only
define Hcomn , the Hamiltonian of the joint system, by giving it on the first factor, where
it is trivial, and on the second factor, where it is Hn. This is the explicit toy model of
a quantum amplifier, we have now to study the question, what quantities at each finite
stage correspond, in the limit, to a macroscopic pointer position of a classical measurement
apparatus?
We need a precise notion of what is a macroscopic system, in terms of the axioms of
quantum mechanics, and what is a macroscopic observable. Although our model owes a
great deal to the Coleman–Hepp model, this notion is the exact opposite of Hepp’s notion
of a local observable (which is also the usual one in the infinite volume thermodynamic
limit of Haag, Ruelle, and others21). We wish to implement the intuition of a function on
the phase space which cannot distinguish between states which differ from each other in a
finite or negligible number of spots.
In the classical methods of thermodynamics, one worked essentially with one observ-
able at a time and there was really a sequence of them for each n. I.e., for each n, one
has fn a physically significant phase function on the space H
com
n , or its classical analogue.
And the physical significance is the same as n varies. It could be total energy of a part of
the system, for example the Brownian mote. For us, it could be a formalisation of some
intuitive idea such as, the percentage of excited particles in the left half of the device.
These methods are acutely, if disparagingly, described by R. Minlos21. “For a long time
the thermodynamic limit was understood and used too formally: the mean values of some
local variables and some relations between them used to be calculated in a finite ensemble
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and then, in the formulas obtained, the limit passage was carried out.” Excellent agree-
ment with experimental results were obtained that way. At any rate, we formally define
such a sequence of fn to be macroscopic if whenever the sequence of norm one vectors
vi ∈ C
2, i > 0, satisfies
lim
n→∞
fn+no(vo ⊗ vno+1 ⊗ vno+2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ vno+n)
exists for some no and some vo ∈ H
com
no
, then it is independent of the choice of no and vo.
We now define the family fn, which in the limit, becomes the pointer position of the
measuring apparatus. There is a basis of Hcomn consisting of separable vectors of the form
ψpi0⊗|π1π2 . . . πn〉 where, as before, the πi are 0 or 1. Let C be the set of basis vectors such
that all but a negligible number of the πi for i < n/2 are 1 and all but a negligible number
of the others are 0. (This is the device being ‘cocked’ and ready to detect. It is very far
from being a stable state, in the limit.) By negligible, we mean that as a proportion of n,
it goes to zero as n increases. For vn any state of the combined system, and we may take
vn normalised of length unity, let ci be the Fourier coefficients of vn with respect to the
cocked basis vectors, i.e., those in C. Define fn(vn) = 1−
∑
i |ci|
2.
Why fn?
We now discuss the physical basis for this choice. Why a sum of amplitudes, squared,
of the Fourier coefficients? (Up to an additive constant.) Opinions are divided as to the
physical reality of the wave function. Certainly it is not easy to directly measure the wave
function or quantum state of a system, even such a simple system as a harmonic oscillator.
What are reasonable to measure are the amplitudes |c1|
2 of the state. In fact these are
the second main object of laboratory measurements (the first is the eigenvalues of H, of
course). It is not directly relevant that the interpretation of what one is doing when one
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experimentally determines these amplitudes is thus and such. It is done every day with
great experimental success. The procedure is a little indirect, but not unduly so. If we
can reliably prepare isomorphic systems repeatedly in the same state,—now the current
experiments on teleportation do this as a matter of course—, then repeated measurements
of trials or measurements of observables give us the relative frequencies we need to estimate
these amplitudes.
It has been often argued by many that this is too indirect, especially because any finite
process would only achieve the determination of a finite number of these amplitudes. And
that therefore the wave function is not real, it is a probability wave, not a real physical
state or a real physical object. But this line of argument is philosophical, not physical. The
philosophy of positivism does indeed maintain the thesis that the meaning of a concept is
how one would observe it. And Heisenberg and Mach did indeed maintain that theoretical
physics should not use theoretical concepts that were meaningless, in this precise sense. But
Feynman, to take only one example,* has argued against this extreme form of positivism.†
Only disagreement with experiment, or logical incoherence, should tell against a physical
theory, not philosophical strictures such as the positivist’s. (Even these are not always
decisive: sometimes the logical incoherence has been fixed by theoreticians, and sometimes
the disagreement with experiment has been fixed by better designed experiments . . . )
Since the squares can be measured, so can their sums, so this is a very natural function
* Another is Weinberg, op. cit., pp. 178ff.
† “Another thing that people have emphasized since quantum mechanics was developed is the idea
that we should not speak about those things that we cannot measure. . . . Unless a thing can be defined
by measurement, it has no place in a theory. . . . The idea that this is what was the matter with classical
theory is a false position. . . . Just because we cannot measure position and momentum precisely does
not a priori mean that we cannot talk about them. It only means that we need not talk about them. . . .
It is always good to know which ideas cannot be checked directly, but it is not necessary to remove them
all. It is not true that we can pursue science completely by using only those concepts which are directly
subject to experiment.” Feynman, Leighton, and Sands, Lectures on Physics, vol. 3, Reading, Mass.,
1965, pp. 2-8f.
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on the quantum phase space to study. It is the very first abelian dynamical observable
which would occur to anybody, and in fact it is the trace of a hermitian projection operator,
so in a different guise it has been much studied.
Passing to the Thermodynamic Limit: the Ming Effect
Our procedure is modelled on that of Ford–Kac–Mazur, which indeed is modelled on
the usual understanding of the Gibbs program. However, a major physical difference is the
renormalisation which we introduce. Another is that the physical quantity whose limit they
study is an autocorrelation; ours is a macroscopic pointer position. Now we are interested
in phenomena in the limit as n approaches ∞, yet one cannot directly compare a value
of fn on a vector vn with fn+1(vn). In keeping with the procedures of classical statistical
mechanics, one compares time or phase averages of the various fn as n varies. (Phase
averages would be taken over the submanifold of accessible states, it is more convenient
for us to deal with time averages. Time averages have been made the basis for Professor
von Plato’s theory of the meaning of probability statements. Pauli22 attributes the same
idea to Einstein) Let the incident particle be in the state described by any (normalised)
wave function in C2. Let it be v0 = a0ψ0+a1ψ1. The amplifier is in the state |111 . . .000〉
in C. We now calculate the limit, as n approaches ∞, of < fn >, where < fn > means
the time average of fn taken over a typical trajectory in the manifold of accessible states
inside of Hcomn .
We will then find a classical dynamical system Ω∞ which has a mixed state X , which
depends on v0, and a classical dynamical variable F whose expectation values match
these limits. At any rate, it is elementary to calculate limn→∞ < fn >, it is |a1|
2. (The
microscopic indident particle triggers a domino effect or macroscopic ‘flash’ which is ‘bright
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and clear’ i.e., ‘Ming’.)
We search for Ω∞, F , and Xv0 as above, satisfying
∫
Ω∞
FdXv0 = lim
n→∞
< fn > .
Let the state of the (classical limit) measurement apparatus where the pointer position
points to cocked (and hence, an absence of detection) be the point P0. Let the state where
the excited states of the apparatus are proceeding from out of its initial cocked state,
and travelling steadily towards the right, be P1. Then Ω∞ = {P0, P1}. The dynamical
variables on this space are generated by the characteristic functions of the two points,
χP0 , χP1 . Let F be χP1 . It is the pointer position which registers detection. The mixed
state of Ω∞ = {P0, P1} which gives the right answer when the incident particle is in
state v0 is the probability distribution which gives P0 the weight |a0|
2, and P1 the weight
|a1|
2. This is precisely what it means to say the the measuring apparatus will register the
presence of the particle with probability |a1|
2, and its absence with probability |a0|
2.
Discussion of macroscopic
As Bell often remarked, there is no place in the physical world where one can put
a precise cut between the microscopic and the macroscopic, and orthodox approaches to
the foundations of Quantum Mechanics fail to be a logical axiomatisation for precisely
this reason. He never remarked that there was a difficulty in giving a precise definition
of probability. It has transpired that these two difficulties are connected. We have made
‘macroscopic’ a linguistic notion so that statements using it are seen to have reference to
an approximation scheme rather than directly to elements of physical reality. (The cut has
been pushed out to infinity, i.e., there is no real cut). The sticking point in all attempts to
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define probability which remain close to the frequency theory has always been what to say
about the negligible set of violators. In our re-deployment, the notion of macroscopic is
that a phenomenon, such as pointer position, is macroscopic if it is defined after neglecting
a negligible set of position violators. For example, we defined a variable on the quantum
phase space which was insensitive to ‘missing’ parts of the needle pointer if their bulk was
too small to be seen by the naked eye. It’s limit was, then, one that neglected it. Because
of the situation of amplification, there are two physical scales, so it is physically natural
to introduce this kind of concept of negligibility. So, what was a ‘sticking point’ in other
schemes, is now quite natural. This answers Feynman’s question as to why probabilities
arise from the necessity of amplification. If the naked eye did not neglect such things,
there would be no need of amplification. Since there is such a need, the naked eye does
neglect them. Neglecting ‘violators’ seems to be the characteristic feature of frequency-
base definitions of probability, and we have the same feature here too, only in a logically
‘clean’ location.
Discussion of Paralipomena
‘Event’ is not a concept that can be expressed within the fully formalised, adequately
axiomatised language of Physics. It has been left out of our short list of fundamental
concepts and it is not defined. (The list was: system, state, Hamiltonian, time.)* Phys-
ically, there is something ‘noisy’ about actual, finite size, event counters. This suggests
that ‘event’ should not be made one of the fundamental primitive concepts, and it even
suggests it should not even be considered as exactly physical, but only an idealised ap-
proximation such as occurs in the thermodynamic limit. ‘Event’ seems to be a classical
* Compare this to Hertz’s list, which was space, mass, time.
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concept of limited validity, no wonder the probabilities arise when we start talking about
‘events’. The word does not occur in the first three axioms of Quantum Mechanics, so we
did not exert ourselves to introduce it. It was a mistake for Born to try to interpret the
wave function in terms of events. What we have done instead is to derive the Born rule as
a useful approximation in certain physical situations. This is not an interpretation.
It is true that individual consciousnesses certainly experience ‘events’ and, indeed,
experience them singly and one at a time. What we have succeeded in defining in terms
of the fundamental axiomatic concepts of Physics is only some statistical properties of
(suitably appropriate) sets of events. Nature and Heisenberg have taught us that it is only
these statistical properties which are replicable. Now, a ‘result’ is not an ‘experimental
result’ unless it is replicable.* Therefore the requirement of agreement with experiment
is satisfied by our theory, because all replicable statistical regularities of the experiences
of events by individual consciousnesses can be stated precisely in the language of Physics,
calculated, and the results do in fact agree (to within experimental accuracy which, inter
alia means neglecting negligible events as a matter of praxis) with experiment.
In fact the following statement is also capable of precise formulation and is verified:
each single event results in a definite result. Note well that this statement is itself a
statistical regularity! It is modelled by the feature of our formalism which says the ther-
modynamic limit system has precisely two points. The only possible events are the points.
Not superpositions. It is a classical system.
No statements in the precise language of Physics are falsified by experimental results or
* Philosophical proof by laughter: every scientist immediately starts laughing when they hear the
title of a satirical journal occasionally put out by scientists in America. The title is, The Journal of
Irreproducible Results.
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by experience because, for example, the following colloquial statement cannot be translated
into our system: (I am afraid this is very Bohrian but after all, Bohr was not actually very
wrong) ‘I ran the experiment and found the spin was up.’ Within the axiomatised language
of Physics, the concept of ‘experiment’ is merely a statistical concept and only describes
an ensemble. No actual dynamical system and initial condition is ‘an experiment’. It is an
amplifier. The concept of ‘measurement’ has been defined as a limit concept. Fortunately,
the colloquial statement is also not replicable! Therefore, as Heisenberg taught us, it is
not necessary for a physical theory to account for it.
But, ‘I ran the experiment and found a definite result’ (or, what is the same thing, ‘I
ran the experiment once and found that the spin was either up or down’) is replicable. It is
modelled by saying that the correlation of the stochastic process on our limit (two-point)
space with itself is unity.
There is a consensus that Quantum Mechanics is mysterious and un-understandable.
It might, therefore, be a mistake to propose a theory which eliminates all mysteries. The
point of the Hilbert problem is simply to shove the mystery into some other location
than the axiomatics and logical structure. This paper has shown that the mystery can
be transferred into the usual philosophical dualism between Physics (materialism) and
subjectivity (Geist). More particularly, there is no physical result which is actually violated
by our experience. Every contingency which can actually be stated clearly and precisely
in our axiom system is ‘subject to the laws of Physics’. This is a true dualism without
being either a monotonous parallelism or a total disconnect. But it is not a domain
problem: every physically formulatable contingency is within the domain of the laws of
Physics (except perhaps negligible contingencies?) It is not as though we can experience
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something which ‘violates’ the laws of Physics.
The disconnect is not total because in our experience we experience subjective reg-
ularities of certain sorts, and the language of Physics is capable of describing statistical
regularities of the same sort, and the two languages do truly describe, in a concordant
fashion, the same regularities. So we have a dualism which is not a parallelism, but has a
precise dictionary for some (but not all) concepts. Perhaps other connections remain to be
discovered. This is the first such connection which is not a full parallelism to be precisely
formulated, but by no means rules out more.
We abandon ‘das sog. Prinzip vom psycho-physikalischen Parallelismus’* in favour of
more modest functors between the two sides of the duality.
Summary
This answers a famous question of Einstein’s partly affirmatively and partly nega-
tively. It is possible to derive the probabilities in measurement results from an underlying
deterministic dynamics analogously to the way it was done in classical statistical mechan-
ics of Einstein’s day. It is not necessary to assume that quantum mechanics is incomplete
in order to do this: we may take the wave function as the complete description of nature
and Schro¨dinger’s equation as exactly and universally valid.
This analysis shows that wave-packet reduction in the strong topology, even approx-
imately, need not occur. It also shows that the transmutation of quantum amplitudes
into classical probabilities depends only on the macroscopic nature of the pointer position
and its coupling to the microscopic system being measured. It does not depend on any
back-force being exerted on the microscopic system. The coupling can be as gentle, in
* von Neumann, op. cit., p. 223.
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its effect on the microscopic system, as desired. It suggests that the degree of validity of
‘measurement,’ as an approximation to a physical amplification process, depends on the
size of the apparatus. Mesoscopic amplifiers should, then, demonstrate detectable noise
phenomena in comparison to macroscopic amplifiers.
This analysis further shows that it is not necessary to invoke the effect of the envi-
ronment in order to construct a logically coherent theory of decoherence. The fact that
probabilities arise even from an amplifier which is in a pure state shows that quantum
measurement can be explained without super-selection rules. Thus the question whether
the observed behaviour of measurement processes is due to the coupling between the ap-
paratus and the microscopic system, or due to the coupling between the apparatus and
the environment24, becomes a question for experiment.
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